Foreign Policy Shutdown

The War in Ukraine is Becoming a Partisan Issue

Reader Note: This Substack always ends up last on my list, with the result that I rarely manage to update it in a timely fashion, so going forward, I’m going to try something a little different: quick posts on current issues, and using it to share the work I’ve published elsewhere more efficiently. In short, I plan to use it as a good old-fashioned blog. You have been warned.

Government shutdowns are an increasingly hardy perennial of Washington life, popping up every couple of years to challenge the notion that America’s institutions are strong. For those whose livelihoods depend on the federal government, the shutdown fights are a source of paramount anxiety; for Washington’s political elites, they are a source of leverage for whichever faction sees it as in their interests to play at brinksmanship with the federal budget.

But even by those low, low standards, the dynamics of this weekend’s government shutdown showdown were bizarre. After weeks of back-and-forth wrangling with Democrats, the Senate, and the right wing of his own caucus, House Speaker Kevin McCarthy suddenly reversed position and brought to the floor a clean, continuing resolution (CR) that would fund the government through November, with just one caveat: it would not provide additional aid for Ukraine.¹

This move was unsurprising to anybody that has been following the politics of the right in recent months – or indeed to anybody that has been following the polls. Almost three-quarters of Americans thought the US should do more or the same in terms of aid to Ukraine back in March 2022, but less than half of Americans take that position today. The shift has been heavily driven by changing views inside the Republican base, where 44% now think that the U.S. is doing too much when it comes to Ukraine.

Despite this, the elimination of Ukraine aid from the CR seemed to be a surprise to many in Washington, and at least one senator briefly put a hold on the bill’s passage over concerns about Ukraine aid. Even worse was the rhetoric. Representatives were quick to criticize Republicans who voted against Ukraine aid, often in ad hominem ways. Representative Jaime Raskin, normally a fairly reasonable voice on foreign policy, described Republicans as “Putin’s little helpers,” while the typically more incendiary David Frum described them as “the pro-Putin caucus.”²

The polls – and this weekend’s showdown – suggest that the issue of Ukraine is well on its way to becoming a partisan issue, a track that rarely results in good outcomes, as the last few years of wrangling over Iran highlights.³ This is matched by the growing toxicity of debate on the topic; it is increasingly difficult for anything like a moderate stance on the conflict to be heard. Indeed, as the war in Ukraine has become politicized, the ability of Washington to approach the conflict strategically has all but vanished.

The emerging partisan battle lines on Ukraine are clear:

• Trump-leaning Republicans – along with a number of Asia hawks – see the war in Ukraine as a new, costly quagmire for the United States, a distraction from China, and from border security issues here at home.  For them, the slow creep of additional aid to Ukraine – and the emergence of programs that have little to do with the war – suggests that America has not yet fully recovered from its nation-building addiction.⁴

Exhibit A

• Democrats, meanwhile, largely identify the war in Ukraine with an American defense of the democratic world. The Biden administration has succeeded to some extent in reorienting the party back towards liberal internationalism, and though there are some concerns among elements of the progressive left about mission creep in Ukraine, the notion of America as the ‘indispensable nation,’ helping other states to resist tyranny, has so far carried the day.

Exhibit B

Both stances lend themselves to maximalist solutions. If the war in Ukraine is indeed a new forever war – and given the Biden administration’s resistance to oversight or constraints on aid – then it makes sense to simply pull the plug. If, on the other hand, the war is a pivotal struggle for the future of world democracy, then it makes sense to continue Ukraine aid for “as long as it takes,” as Biden continues to put it.

In reality, of course, the situation is more muddled. U.S. support has been essential in helping Ukraine to hold its own and push back the Russian invasion. That’s a good thing for global norms of sovereignty, and good for U.S. interests. It’s also true that for a fairly small investment, U.S. support for Ukraine has helped to decimate Russian forces – and all without direct involvement. The escalation risks have been manageable for the most part, and the White House has been fairly good at shutting down the truly stupid ideas – like setting up a no-fly zone in Ukraine – quickly.

At the same time, the war has become one of attrition, and further Ukrainian territorial gains are likely to be incremental and modest. Escalation risks remain. There are serious questions about the sustainability of the war, whether that’s western arms and ammunition production, the budgetary costs of sustaining the Ukrainian government directly, or the ability of Ukrainians to source the manpower necessary for a prolonged campaign. Similar problems apply on the Russian side, but sanctions have not proved disastrous to Russia’s capabilities to regenerate a somewhat capable defensive force.

Most problematically, the United States has no clear strategic goals in the war and has apparently recommitted to spearhead European defense for the long-term.

Increasingly squeezed by the politics of this moment is anyone who takes a moderate view of Ukraine. In short: anyone who thinks that it’s good for the U.S. to support Ukraine to some extent, that the U.S. has some interest in European security, but that Ukraine is not the be-all-and-end-all for U.S. foreign policy, and that it might be distracting us from other important foreign policy issues.

Hint: China

With no place in our discourse for moderation, there’s no discussion of the limits of our support for Ukraine, the potential costs and risks of a long war, or the possibility of pursuing any diplomatic options that present themselves. Consider the response this summer to news that some fellows from the Council on Foreign Relations had traveled to Russia to discuss the war. The purpose of the trip was laudable – feeling out whether there was any appetite in Moscow for diplomacy to end the conflict – but it was met with open derision, and as a betrayal of Ukraine.

Yet the tendency towards absolutism in the Ukraine debate is taking us down an increasingly dangerous road.

On the one hand, there’s the risk that GOP opponents will succeed in completely cutting aid to Ukraine with no warning, undermining what the U.S. has achieved there in the last eighteen months. On the other hand, there’s the risk that our strategy of boiling a frog in Ukraine – slowly increasing support over time to avoid sudden escalation – will come back to bite us. If Washington cannot conceive of an outcome where Ukraine doesn’t obtain an absolute victory, then the U.S. may find itself committing more and more resources to reach an impossible victory, as recent calls for the U.S. to station military advisors in Ukraine highlight. The “forever wars” comparison between Afghanistan and Ukraine is facile, but this is one area where it seems eerily accurate.

Yikes on Bikes.

If both sides persist in their approach, the Ukraine question will become more politicized – and as we move into the 2024 presidential campaign – the all-or-nothing dynamics of the conflict will only become more pronounced. That may close the window for moderation for good.

1. We’re still waiting to find out if McCarthy can hold on to the speakership after his choice to buck some of his members. It’s also not yet clear if he’ll bring a straight Ukraine aid bill to the floor; there is more than sufficient bipartisan support to ensure that such a bill would pass for now, but McCarthy might be in violation of the Hastert rule — he has lost the majority of his majority on Ukraine.

2. It’s worth noting that the political genesis of this rhetoric goes back further than 2022. Democrats increasingly conflate the war in Ukraine with a struggle for democracy here at home, a process that began with Donald Trump’s first impeachment in 2020. Though a wholly justified prosecution – with a strong focus on corruption and Trump’s willingness to shake down foreign powers for his own personal gain – the process nonetheless saw house impeachment managers and witnesses repeatedly conflate Ukrainian and American interests.

3. If you don’t follow the issue, you can get a feel for the horrifying toxicity of the Iran debate from this article last week, and the pushback to it.

4. Some recent reporting from Politico highlighted this trend. The Department of State is apparently helping Ukraine to eradicate corruption, along with programs focused on teaching english, embracing NATO terminology in its military publications, undermining the role of oligarchs in Ukraine’s business scene, and decentralizing and privatizing business. The irony of the Biden administration’s embrace of classic neoliberal reforms inside Ukraine while doing everything it has in the international and domestic economy is not lost on me.