I agree there really isn’t a realistic path to Ukraine reconquering all of the lost territory at the moment. I also think the Europeans really need to be getting their defense industrial base issues fixed and be taking the laboring oar here as China and the Pacific are going to strain our limited budget resources in coming years as is.
However, is there any reason to believe that Putin would accept any reasonable peace deal at the moment (as distinguished from one merely intended to set up Ukraine for conquest in the next round in a few years)? If his only offers are absurd, what is the best way forward?
Agree with Greg Sanders that you seem to be projecting your concerns on to Trump, MTG and Johnson. The supplemental is as large as it is probably because the administration thinks this is the best way of pressuring the Republican congressional leadership to act and to avoid the kind of serial hostage taking seen in debt limit negotiations. And it is a message to the Russians, who as it is have no incentive not to grind on in the face of weakening opposition. In that context, you do not address the large majority in the Senate who passed the bill. There is no question, I don't think, that the same would happen in the House if the bill were allowed to come to a vote. In any case, the battlefield realities make it clear that Ukraine must concentrate on defense for the foreseeable future. Without support from the US, that defense looks like it will fail, with disastrous consequences for Ukrainians and Europe. Maybe this seems like tired conventional wisdom to you, but looking at the current Congress' legislative record, hard to see them articulating and implementing an enlightened alternative strategy, to say the least.
I don't think the War on Terror analogy is particularly apt. The questions of best strategy, marginal employment of resources, they all make sense. But counterinsurgency and military state building had a notably poor track record, any number of nationalist campaigns against would be conquers and imperial occupiers have succeeded.
I'd be surprised if there were enough votes that were simply skeptical of the spending to lead to victory. I could be wrong there, and if you're right it would be certainly better to get half a loaf if it comes to that. But the biggest obstacles instead are the Viktor Orban fanclub.
None of this is to counter the larger strategic point. I tend to think of the supplemental as buying time for the European's to get their act together, put out some EU ponds, and engage in some protectionist industrial capacity building. But I do think your strategic critiques are much more compelling than your U.S. whip counting, as chasing the vote of a bad faith actor is a lot less compelling than just saving Ukranian blood and allied treasure. I'm more comfortable trusting the judgment of Ukranian elected leaders here, but elected leaders can make mistakes even when fighting for national survival.
1. The Ukrainian regime is one of the nastiest since 1945. This is not surprising, considering that they have openly recruited neo-nazis, hold up Nazi collaborators as national heroes, and pattern themselves after the Third Reich. The US is entirely on board with this.
2. Ukraine will eventually get its money. Trump is weak, stupid and easily manipulated. Those who continue to doubt should recall his two failed attempts to leave Syria, cucking out both times.
I agree there really isn’t a realistic path to Ukraine reconquering all of the lost territory at the moment. I also think the Europeans really need to be getting their defense industrial base issues fixed and be taking the laboring oar here as China and the Pacific are going to strain our limited budget resources in coming years as is.
However, is there any reason to believe that Putin would accept any reasonable peace deal at the moment (as distinguished from one merely intended to set up Ukraine for conquest in the next round in a few years)? If his only offers are absurd, what is the best way forward?
Agree with Greg Sanders that you seem to be projecting your concerns on to Trump, MTG and Johnson. The supplemental is as large as it is probably because the administration thinks this is the best way of pressuring the Republican congressional leadership to act and to avoid the kind of serial hostage taking seen in debt limit negotiations. And it is a message to the Russians, who as it is have no incentive not to grind on in the face of weakening opposition. In that context, you do not address the large majority in the Senate who passed the bill. There is no question, I don't think, that the same would happen in the House if the bill were allowed to come to a vote. In any case, the battlefield realities make it clear that Ukraine must concentrate on defense for the foreseeable future. Without support from the US, that defense looks like it will fail, with disastrous consequences for Ukrainians and Europe. Maybe this seems like tired conventional wisdom to you, but looking at the current Congress' legislative record, hard to see them articulating and implementing an enlightened alternative strategy, to say the least.
I don't think the War on Terror analogy is particularly apt. The questions of best strategy, marginal employment of resources, they all make sense. But counterinsurgency and military state building had a notably poor track record, any number of nationalist campaigns against would be conquers and imperial occupiers have succeeded.
I'd be surprised if there were enough votes that were simply skeptical of the spending to lead to victory. I could be wrong there, and if you're right it would be certainly better to get half a loaf if it comes to that. But the biggest obstacles instead are the Viktor Orban fanclub.
None of this is to counter the larger strategic point. I tend to think of the supplemental as buying time for the European's to get their act together, put out some EU ponds, and engage in some protectionist industrial capacity building. But I do think your strategic critiques are much more compelling than your U.S. whip counting, as chasing the vote of a bad faith actor is a lot less compelling than just saving Ukranian blood and allied treasure. I'm more comfortable trusting the judgment of Ukranian elected leaders here, but elected leaders can make mistakes even when fighting for national survival.
1. The Ukrainian regime is one of the nastiest since 1945. This is not surprising, considering that they have openly recruited neo-nazis, hold up Nazi collaborators as national heroes, and pattern themselves after the Third Reich. The US is entirely on board with this.
2. Ukraine will eventually get its money. Trump is weak, stupid and easily manipulated. Those who continue to doubt should recall his two failed attempts to leave Syria, cucking out both times.